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in a Technological World—Using the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
to Establish a Minimum Data Protection 
Standard across Latin America 
Josiah Wolfson* 
Privacy is a human right that many in the world do not enjoy. 
The failure of many countries to prioritize privacy through 
the passage and enforcement of comprehensive data protec-
tion laws has left their citizens vulnerable. The Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights should use its authority to set a 
minimum data protection standard for its Member States. 
This Note discusses the historical development of data pro-
tection, the current data protection gap in Latin America, 
and proposes the role that the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights should play in advancing a minimum data pro-
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION 
My Jewish grandfather was living in Nazi-occupied Europe with 
his sister and parents in the late 1930s. With the rise of anti-Semi-
tism in the region, his father decided that the family would leave 
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everything in search of a better life in the United States. One morn-
ing, my grandfather and his family went to the train station to begin 
the journey out of Europe. However, after officials at the train sta-
tion reviewed their database of records, the officials refused to grant 
my family passage because Jews were banned from leaving the city. 
The Nazi Reich had partnered with International Business Machines 
(IBM), a privately owned census tabulating company, to systemati-
cally identify the Jews living in Europe and created a card sorting 
system that assisted the Nazis in the technological “automation of 
human destruction.”1 
After the allies won World War II, many IBM executives were 
prosecuted for their roles in collecting and synthesizing the Jewish 
populations’ personal data.2 The conclusion of the war ended the use 
of personal databases to discriminate against Jews, but the stored 
information in the databases was never destroyed.3 The perils sur-
rounding the unwanted use of people’s personal information is 
something many around the world still face today. Millions of peo-
ple living in Latin America4 remain at risk of private and public en-
tities collecting, processing, and misusing their personal information 
because those governments have failed to implement comprehen-
sive data protection laws.5 In light of this human right gap, the Inter-
                                                                                                             
 1 EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 
BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION 8 
(2001); see also Marc Langheinrich, Privacy by Design — Principles of Privacy-
Aware Ubiquitous Systems, SWISS FEDERAL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 
http://graphics.stanford.edu/~bjohanso/csd2003-ispace/lanheinrich-privacy.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2015); see, e.g., VICTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: 
THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN A DIGITAL AGE (Princeton, 2009) (reporting that 
the Nazis used the information contained in the comprehensive Dutch Registry 
database to identify, deport, and murder a higher percentage (73%) of the Dutch 
Jewish population than other nations that did not maintain similar databases). 
 2 See BLACK, supra note 1, at 6-15. 
 3 Id. 
 4 For purposes of this Article, Latin America includes all countries in the 
Americas, spanning from Mexico down to Argentina. 
 5 Camila Tobón, Data Privacy in Latin America: An Overview, 44 no. 2 
ABA INT’L LAW NEWS 1, 6 (2015) (asserting that Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Venezuela have yet to pass domestic data protection laws); see 
DLA PIPER’S GLOBAL DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY TEAM, DATA 
PROTECTION LAWS OF THE WORLD, http://dlapiperdataprotection.com/#hand-
book/world-map-section/c1_HN (last visited Nov. 26, 2015) [hereinafter DLA 
PIPER] (providing state by state comparison of data protection laws around the 
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American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) should use its au-
thority, pursuant to the American Convention on Human Rights 
(“American Convention”), to establish a minimum data protection 
standard across Latin America.6 
Data protection laws generally require that the data controller7 
meet applicable conditions to store, process, or distribute personal8 
or sensitive9 data about the data subject.10 However, no data protec-
tion law is absolute in its protection of the data subject, and instead 
“must be considered in relation to [the law’s] function in society.”11 
                                                                                                             
world); see also Aldo M. Leiva, Data Protection Law in Spain and Latin America: 
Survey of Legal Approaches, 41 no. 4 ABA INT’L LAW NEWS 6 (2012). 
 6 It is impossible to analyze this multifaceted issue from a macro perspective 
without generalizing my critique of the region as a whole. However, each Latin 
American country is unique and has made differing efforts to protect individual’s 
data through domestic regulations or the absence thereof. See generally 
PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES COMMITTEE 
ON POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL AFFAIRS, COMPARATIVE STUDY: DATA 
PROTECTION IN THE AMERICAS, OEA/Ser.G CP/CAJP-3063/12 (Apr. 3, 2012), 
http://www.oas.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/CP-CAJP-3063-12_en.pdf [hereinafter COMP
ARATIVE STUDY] (addressing the Latin American State’s data protection regulati
ons individually). 
 7 Data Protection Definitions, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, 
https://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/councilsec/compliance/dataprotection/definitions/ 
(last updated Nov. 28, 2013) (the person (or organization) who determines the 
purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are, or are to be, 
processed (e.g. the University)). 
 8 Id. (“Data which relate to a living individual who can be identified from 
that information, or from that and other information which is in the possession of 
or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller. It includes any 
expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions of 
the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual (subject to very 
limited exceptions).). 
 9 Id. (“Information relating to race or ethnic origin, political opinions, reli-
gious beliefs, physical/mental health, trade union membership, sexual life or crim-
inal activities. Special conditions apply to the processing of this type of infor-
mation, including an obligation to obtain the explicit consent of the individual 
(except in limited circumstances).”). 
 10 Id. (“Any living individual who is the subject of personal data (e.g. student, 
applicant, member of staff, supervisor, referee etc).”). 
 11 See, e.g., CJEU, Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker and Markus 
Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v. Land Hessen, 9 November 2010, para. 48. 
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Therefore, the right to data protection is subject to limitations, such 
as national security.12 
Data protection has become increasingly important because the 
development of technology has led to prevalent data collecting and 
processing in the public and private sectors.13 Countless government 
entities report the recurrent collecting and tracking of individuals’ 
online movement.14 There is no indication of this trend slowing 
down as businesses continue to increase demand for big data pro-
cessing jobs.15 
Global media sources repeatedly inform the public of the dan-
gers associated with the processing of personal data. The dangers 
surrounding inadequate data protection extend beyond voluntary 
consumers to the majority of people using modern technology, 
which tends to be conjoined with the participation in a modern so-
ciety.16 Consumers that refuse to participate in the market because 
                                                                                                             
 12 Data Protection Definitions, supra note 8; e.g., (When “the processing is 
necessary for the administration of justice; for the exercise of any functions con-
ferred by or under enactment; for the exercise of any functions of the Crown, a 
Minister of the Crown or a government department; for the exercise of any other 
functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest.”); see also FRA, 
HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 2d Ed. 14 (2014), http://fra.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protection-law-2nd-ed_
en.pdf. 
 13 See generally EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, PRIVACY AND 
COMPETITIVENESS IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN DATA 
PROTECTION, COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE DIGITAL 
ECONOMY (Mar. 1, 2014), https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/sit
e/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2014/14-03-26_competiti-
tion_law_big_data_EN.pdf (illustrating how “online services are driving the huge 
growth in the digital economy”). 
 14 Ginger Adams Otis, NSA can read emails, online chats and track Web 
browsing habits without warrant, documents leaked by Edward Snowden show, 
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:05 AM), http://www.nydailynews.co
m/news/national/nsa-read-emails-warrent-docs-article-1.1413633. 
 15 Louis Columbus, Where Big Data Jobs Will Be in 2015, FORBES (Dec. 29, 
2014, 3:23 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2014/12/29/where-
big-data-jobs-will-be-in-2015/. 
 16 ABOUT THE DATA, https://www.aboutthedata.com/ (discussing companies 
like Acxiom who collect and aggregate individuals’ information from surveys, 
registrations, purchases, postings, public records, online searching, etc.). 
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of these dangers constrain the success of the global economy.17 Alt-
hough expert opinions vary on how far reaching the scope of data 
protection should be and what, if any, regulatory role states should 
play, there is a consensus that the topic of data protection—storage, 
processing, and movement of personal information—will remain a 
important issue in the future.18 
In this age of social media, where people snap their every mo-
ment, the importance of data protection should be readily apparent. 
However, people either do not know or do not care that their per-
sonal and sometimes sensitive data may, once collected, be: (1) sold 
to private companies; (2) processed anywhere in the world; (3) ac-
cessed by a government agency without just cause; (4) stored for an 
indefinite period of time; and (5) used for an unintended purpose.19 
Consumers are often unaware that their personal data is in a database 
because they are uninformed and many countries permit data con-
trollers to take advantage of this ignorance by not having a compre-
hensive data protection law. For example, most email accounts, 
which historically saved emails only to the consumers’ personal 
hard drive, are now saved to a remote company server.20 As individ-
uals’ data footprints have grown in size and technology has allowed 
for more far reaching data procurement and storage, the risks asso-
ciated with individuals’ personal data have increased.21 
Entities in both the public and private sector regularly fail to pro-
vide adequate data security for the customers’ or employees’ per-
                                                                                                             
 17 See discussion infra Section IV. 
 18 Michael Yang, Francis J. Gorman, What’s Yours Is Mine Protection And 
Security In A Digital World, 36 MD. B.J. 24, 24-33 (2003). 
 19 See Kenneth M. Siegel, Protecting the Most Valuable Corporate Asset: 
Electronic Data, Identity Theft, Personal Information, and the Role of Data Se-
curity in the Information Age, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 779, 783-89 (2007). 
 20 Ilana R. Kattan, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Communica-
tions Act Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the Cloud, 13 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 617, 638-39 (2011). 
 21 LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS 
RATIONALE, LOGIC, AND LIMITS 13 (2002). 
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sonal data, which increases the likelihood of those individuals’ pri-
vacy being violated.22 According to a recent report, the world’s big-
gest tech companies are failing to comply with data privacy rights.23 
Data abuses most commonly occur because the personal data is (1) 
misused—leading to identity theft and fraud;24 (2) leaked—when an 
entity inappropriately releases or voluntarily allows access to indi-
vidual’s information that should be kept private; (3) unsecured—
when an entity that holds the information provides inadequate pro-
tection of the personal data.25 Once an individual’s personal data has 
been leaked or left unsecure, his risk of future associated harm in-
creases.26 The failure of adequate data protection mechanisms cre-
ates an environment where public and private entities may unjusti-
fiably access, store, and distribute individuals’ personal data without 
any consequence. 
The majority of countries have established some form of data 
protection structure, and certain international bodies have adopted a 
regional data protection standard.27 National strategies include strin-
gent European-based data protection laws, habeas data provisions, 
and sector specific data regulatory structures.28 
                                                                                                             
 22 See generally Tsutomu Johnson, Sorry I Lost Your Files: Cybersecurity 
Threats to Confidentiality, 28 UTAH B.J. 41, 41-43 (2015) (claiming that a hacker 
looking to steal information [from a private corporation] will likely find the vault 
unlocked); see also Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers 
Exposed 21.5 Million People, The New York Times (July 9, 2015), http://www.n
ytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/office-of-personnel-management-hackers-got-data-of
-millions.html?_r=0. 
 23 Sam Thielman, World’s biggest tech companies get failing grade on data-
privacy rights, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/tech-
nology/2015/nov/03/data-protection-failure-google-facebook-ranking-digital-
rights. 
 24 Rob Waugh, Worldwide cost of identity theft could be $5 billion per year, 
Microsoft survey finds, WeLiveSecurity (Feb. 12, 2014, 6:42 AM), 
http://www.welivesecurity.com/2014/02/12/worldwide-cost-of-identity-theft-co
uld-be-5-billion-per-year-microsoft-survey-finds/. 
 25 ANUPAM CHANDER ET AL., SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 113 
(2008). 
 26 Id. at 126. 
 27 DLA PIPER, supra note 5. 
 28 See generally Lee A. Bygrave, Privacy and Data Protection in an Interna-
tional Perspective, SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN L. 165, 165-200 (2010), http://ww
w.uio.no/stuier/emner/jus/jus/JUR5630/v11/undervisningsmateriale/Privacy%20
and%20Data%20Protection%20in%20International%20Perspective.pdf. 
2017] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 195 
 
Data protection is comprised of a seemingly infinite number of 
topics, but the scope of this Note is limited to the need and ability of 
the IACtHR to advance a minimum data protection standard in the 
Latin America. This Note does not seek to propose the specifics of 
that minimum standard, nor does it evaluate the details of individual 
states’ current domestic data protection laws. Specifically, Section 
II addresses the historical development of data protection. Section 
III discusses the data protection gap in Latin America. Section IV 
examines the economic benefits surrounding a minimum data pro-
tection standard. Section V demonstrates the absence of any viable 
alternatives. Section VI discusses the IACtHR’s jurisdiction. Sec-
tion VII provides a rational basis for the Court advancing a mini-
mum data protection standard. Section VIII proposes the role that 
the IACtHR should play in the region. 
SECTION II: THE HISTORICAL PROGRESSION OF DATA PROTECTION 
Data protection legislation has drawn on the principles of “a per-
son’s right of privacy, autonomy, integrity, and dignity.”29 Since the 
first data protection laws, legislators have focused on protecting hu-
man rights, while attempting to avoid significantly stifling techno-
logical innovation and economic growth.30 Warren and Brandeis’ 
popular article, The Right to Privacy, was based on the idea 
that ”[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition 
of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to 
meet the demands of society.”31 Specifically, they asserted, under 
the right to informational privacy, the “right to be let alone” was not 
one of the “rights arising from contract or from special trust, but are 
rights as against the world.”32 Judicial and legislative bodies have 
continued to expand the scope of the right to privacy in the years 
                                                                                                             
 29 Id. at 167. 
 30 See id. at 180-86. 
 31 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 193, 213 (1890); For more on the invention of the modern right to pri-
vacy, see generally Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
 32 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31, at 193-213. 
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since in an attempt to adapt to technological advances, like the In-
ternet and credit cards.33 Institutions across the world now define a 
person’s right to privacy or a person’s right to freedom of expression 
to include his personal data, which may include text stored on paper 
or bytes stored in the form of electronic memory.34 
The international community initially discussed a right to pri-
vacy in the aftermath of World War II.35 In 1948, the United Nations 
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Declara-
tion”), thereby granting the right of privacy for the first time in mod-
ern history.36 Specifically, Article 12 of the Declaration states: “No 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation.”37 Although different methods of data protection cur-
rently exist across individual countries and regions throughout the 
world, its roots are European. 
A. Europe 
Europe has been a trailblazer in the way it has propelled data 
protection laws globally and has maintained a regulatory framework 
with the highest protective standards of any continent. In 1950, the 
Council of Europe adopted the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Con-
vention”).38 The European Convention emulated the Declaration, in 
part, by providing a safeguard for privacy, but by also introducing 
the protection of a person’s “private life.” Article 8 of the Conven-
tion declares, in relevant part, “[e]veryone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” 
and that a government shall not interfere with this right unless its 
                                                                                                             
 33 JONATHAN K. SOBEL ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF DATA PROTECTION AS A 
PRIVACY CONCERN, AND THE CONTRACT LAW DYNAMICS UNDERLYING IT 57 
(2008). 
 34 See generally RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATIONAL LAW Ch. 8 (2003). 
 35 KEVIN M. KEENAN, INVASION OF PRIVACY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 129 
(2005). 
 36 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration]. 
 37 Id. at art. 12. 
 38 Eur. Conv. on H.R. Conv. Rome, Conv. for the Protection of H.R. and Fun-
damental Freedoms (Nov. 4, 1950) [hereinafter European Convention on Human 
Rights]. 
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conduct follows from the limited exceptions listed in the Conven-
tion.39 
The Council of Europe created the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECtHR”) in 1959, which was tasked with enforcing the Eu-
ropean Convention.40 The ECtHR began to define the scope of Ar-
ticle 8 protections through its early jurisprudence. Specifically, the 
ECtHR considered whether States had violated Article 8 of the Eu-
ropean Convention by interfering with individual petitioners’ right 
to private life, without a legally justified basis that was necessary 
and proportionate to that end.41 The ECtHR has since interpreted 
Article 8 to include the protection of personal data.42 The Court held 
that “the protection of personal data . . . is of fundamental im-
portance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for 
private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the [European] 
Convention.”43 Although the ECtHR has broadly interpreted the 
reach of Article 8, the Court has refrained from ruling that the pro-
cessing of personal data, in and of itself, is a per se Article 8 trig-
ger.44 
In 1968, at the request of the Council of Europe, the Committee 
of Human Rights (“Committee”) conducted a study on the “effec-
tiveness of the protection offered under the [European Convention] 
and by legislation of the member States to the right of privacy 
against violations caused by the use of modern scientific and tech-
nological devices.”45 The Committee produced an interim report, 
                                                                                                             
 39 Id. at art. 8 
 40 U.N. Declaration, supra note 36. 
 41 Peter Hustinx, EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46
/EC and the Proposed General Data Protection Regulation 1, 3-4 (2015), https:/
/secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/E
DPS/Publications/Speeches/2014/14-09-15_Article_EUI_EN.pdf. 
 42 See e.g., Klass v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978); Malone v. United King-
dom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1984); Leander v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1987); Gaskin v. 
United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989); Niemietz v. Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(1992); Halford v. United Kingdom Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997); Amann v. Switzerland, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000); Rotaru v. Romania, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000). 
 43 Z v. Finland, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 95 (1997), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=0
01-58033#{“itemid”:[“001-58033”]}. 
 44 Hustinx, supra note 41, at 7. 
 45 FRITS W. HONDIUS, EMERGING DATA PROTECTION IN EUROPE 65, 65 
(1975). 
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which concluded, in general, that the reach of the European Con-
vention was still imprecise.46 Specifically, the report found that the 
European Convention’s human right structure did not sufficiently 
protect the right of privacy because it merely focused on the inter-
ferences by public authorities and failed to “extend to the relations 
of private parties inter se.”47 
In 1970, Hessen, Germany created a written regulation regard-
ing data privacy through the domestic passage of the Bun-
desdatenschutzgesetz law, which became the world’s first data pro-
tection law.48 Germany subsequently passed a federal data protec-
tion law and a handful of European countries followed suit.49 The 
individual States are said to have passed the progressive laws in re-
sponse to the widespread discourse on data protection that began in 
the United States a decade earlier.50 Over 45 years later, more than 
fifty percent of the domestic data protection laws around the world 
are from European countries.51 
The Council of Europe, in an effort “to secure . . . for every in-
dividual . . . respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in 
particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic processing 
of personal data,” created the Convention for the Protection of Indi-
viduals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
(“Convention 108”).52 The Council of Europe opened Convention 
108 for signature by the Council of Europe Member States in 1981 
                                                                                                             
 46 Id. 
 47 Id; see e.g., Marckx v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1979), http://hudoc.echr.c
oe.int/eng?i=001-57534 (showing that in addition to the primarily negative un-
dertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective “respect” for 
privacy enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention). 
 48 Datenschutzgesetz, Oct. 7, 1970, HESSISCHES GESETZ-UND VEROR
DNUNGSBLATT I, [hereinafter German Data Protection Act]. 
 49 Gesetz zum Missbrauch personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenverarbei-
tung [Act Concerning the Abuse of Data in Data Processing], Jan. 27, 1977, 
BGBL I at 201. 
 50 Id; see also THOMAS HOEREN & SONJA EUSTERGERLING, PRIVACY AND 
DATA PROTECTION AT THE WORKPLACE IN GERMANY 211-12 (2005). 
 51 Graham Greenleaf, Global Data Privacy Laws: 89 Countries, and Accel-
erating, 115 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. INT’L. REP. (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2000034. 
 52 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Pro-
cessing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981 E.T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter Convention 
108]. 
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and all of the States, with the exception of Turkey, have since signed 
and ratified it.53 Convention 108, which was the first binding re-
gional data protection law in the world, set benchmarks designed to 
protect individuals from potential abuses that could arise with the 
collection and processing of personal data.54 Convention 108 was 
designed to regulate a variety of issues, such as the trans-border flow 
of personal data.55 Simply put, Convention 108’s data protection re-
strictions have an extraterritorial dimension by prohibiting the ex-
port of data to countries that lack adequate data protection.56 
By the 1990s, the Member States had passed individual domes-
tic data protection laws within their respective States based on Con-
vention 108’s principles.57 However, the European Union (“EU”) 
quickly recognized that the variety of domestic data protection laws 
created inconsistency between the States, which obstructed the free 
flow of data and the functionality of the EU’s internal market.58 
In 1995, the EU, in an effort to increase the congruence of the 
States’ domestic data protection laws, built on the success of Con-
vention 108 and adopted Directive 95/46/EC (“Directive”).59 The 
                                                                                                             
 53 Id. 
 54 FRA, HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW 2d Ed. 14 
(2014), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-handbook-data-protection
-law-2nd-ed_en.pdf. 
 55 Julia Fromholz, The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461, 469 (2000). 
 56 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 
1504-05 (2000) (explaining that a state must fulfill the Convention 108’s ade-
quacy and enforcement criteria to process Europeans’ data). 
 57 See e.g., Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux 
fichiers et aux libertés [Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978 concerning data processing, 
records and freedom], Journal Officiel du 7 janvier et rectificatif au [J.O.] du 25 
janvier [hereinafter French Law]; The Danish Private Registers Act, No. 293, June 
8, 1978, amended by Act No. 383, June 10, 1987, translated in Danish Ministry 
of Justice, Pub. No. 622 (Oct. 2, 1987) [hereinafter Danish Law]; Wet Per-
soonsregistraties [Act of Dec. 28, 1988, providing rules for the protection of pri-
vacy in connection with personal data files], Stb. 1988, at 665, translated in Coun-
cil of Europe Doc. CJ-PD (89) 4 (Jan. 27, 1989), reprinted in A. Nugter, Trans-
border Flow of Personal Data Within the EC 397-410 (1990) [hereinafter Dutch 
Law]. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
Oct. 1995 O.J. (L 281), 23/11/1995 P. 0031-0050, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex-
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Directive required all Member States to pass domestic legislation 
that complied with the specifics of the Directive.60 It has served as 
one of the most important pieces of legislation on data protection.61 
In short, the Directive specifies the general rules on data processing 
and explains the protection that data subjects are entitled to.62 More-
over, the Directive prohibits an entity from possessing personal data 
that is not transparent, held for a legitimate purpose, and proportion-
ate to the legitimate purpose.63 Although the Directive has increased 
data protection consistency among the Member States, the laws 
across the region remain far from uniform. Some states, like France, 
have gone above and beyond the minimum requirements outlined in 
the Directive.64 Critics complain that the Directive’s failure to set a 
ceiling for the data protection standards has led to states passing 
overly onerous regulations, contrary to the Directive’s intent of es-
tablishing a harmonized data protection standard.65  The Directive 
serves as evidence that the right to “protection of personal data” has 
developed from its origins in informational privacy to a basic human 
right in and of itself.66 
The European data protection regulations have had a global in-
fluence. As discussed above, Europe implemented a protectionist 
data protection structure, which requires a state to pass and enforce 
                                                                                                             
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML (protecting indi-
vidual Europeans with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement thereof). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Eve M. Brunts et. al., The International Clinical Trials Roadmap: Steering 
Clear of Legal and Practical Roadblocks, 5 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 49 (2012). 
 62 See generally Hustinx, supra note 41. 
 63 Id. 
 64 French Law, supra note 57, at art. 1, see e.g., France’s relevant domestic 
law, which may be the broadest data protection law of any of the Member States. 
The domestic law states “Information technology should be at the service of every 
citizen. Its development shall take place in the context of international coopera-
tion. It shall not violate human identity, human rights, privacy, or individual or 
public liberties.” 
 65 Tracie B. Loring, An Analysis of the Informational Privacy Protection Af-
forded by the European Union and the United States, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421, 424-
25 (2002). 
 66 González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Funda-
mental Right of the EU (2014); Convention 108, supra note 51, at art. 8. 
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a domestic data protection law that is adequate by European stand-
ards.67 Non-member states around the world have performed the ac-
cession requirements, pursuant to Article 23 of Convention 108, in 
an attempt to gain access to the estimated 500 million consumers 
across Europe.68 
B. Asia 
The Asia-Pacific region’s data protection strategy is based on an 
economic incentive. In 2004, the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (“APEC”) 21 Member States, which account for a third of the 
world’s population and half of the global Gross Domestic Produc-
tion, adopted the APEC Privacy Framework (“Framework”).69 The 
Framework includes a number of popular privacy principles found 
in other domestic and regional data protection legislation.70 For ex-
ample, the Framework recommends the regulation of the collection, 
quality, security, use, access to, and correction of personal infor-
mation.71 However, critics have pointed to the voluntary nature of 
the agreement and the inexistence of enforcement measures, which 
make it superficial in nature.72 Similarly, the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) has committed to publish a best 
practices data protection manual in an effort to create further har-
monization between the Member States’ economies in the face of 
globalization.73 Both organizations are attempting to set up uniform 
                                                                                                             
 67 Convention 108, supra note 51, at art. 23 (requiring that a petitioning state 
be found to have adequate domestic data protection regulations and effective en-
forcement mechanisms). 
 68 Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on In-
ternational Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471, 484 (1995). 
 69 Graham Greenleaf, Five years of the APEC Privacy Framework: Failure 
or promise?, 25 COMP. L. & SECURITY REV. 28, 28 (2009). 
 70 See generally id. 
 71 See generally APEC SECRETARIAT, APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, (2005), 
http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-Investment/~/media/File
s/Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx. 
 72 See generally APEC GROUP ON SERVICES, MENU OF OPTIONS FOR 
VOLUNTARY LIBERALIZATION, FACILITATION, AND PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC 
AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN SERVICES TRADE AND INVESTMENT (Aug. 15, 
2003), http://www.apec.org/~/media/Files/Groups/GOS/03_cti_gos_moo.pdf. 
 73 EDWIN LEE YONG CIEH, BEYOND DATA PROTECTION: STRATEGIC CASE 
STUDIES AND PRACTICAL GUIDANCE—PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AND 
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rules to encourage and stabilize e-commerce growth. However, nei-
ther the APEC nor ASEAN have established any legitimate 
measures to keep their respective nations accountable for passing or 
enforcing domestic data protection laws. 
C. The United States 
The United States (U.S.) has resisted the global trend toward 
comprehensive data protection.74 Some domestic data protection 
bills have been proposed, but none have garnered the requisite leg-
islative support to become law.75 Instead, the U.S. data-protection 
scheme uses a sectoral76 model that relies on the self-regulation of 
industries and individual businesses.77 The U.S. data protection 
structure has created problems domestically and internationally. 
The fragmented U.S. data protection structure fails to protect its 
citizens’ personal information.78 Simply put, data subjects’ breach 
of privacy claims are repeatedly dismissed because the claims fail 
to violate the limited industry-specific sectoral laws. For example, a 
U.S. District Judge dismissed a class action lawsuit against Face-
book for “secretly tracking the Internet activity of its users after they 
log off” because the Court found that subscribers didn’t specify how 
they were harmed or what law Facebook had violated.79 Data con-
trollers in the U.S. make a practice of privately storing a mass 
                                                                                                             
PRIVACY LAW IN MALAYSIA 14 (Noriswadi Ismail, Edwin Lee Yong Cieh, eds., 
2012). 
 74 See generally Ryan Moshell, . . . and Then There Was One: The Outlook 
for A Self-Regulatory United States Amidst A Global Trend Toward Comprehen-
sive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357 (2005). 
 75 Id. at 367 (Describing the self-regulatory model as “companies and indus-
try bodies establish[ing] governance through codes and self-policing.”). 
 76 Id. (Describing the sectoral model as involving “no general laws; rather, it 
only targets those specific industries shown to be a threat to data privacy.”). 
 77 Anna E. Shimanek, Do You Want Milk With Those Cookies?: Complying 
With the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 26 J. CORP. L. 455, 472 (2001). 
 78 Moshell, supra note 74, at 373. 
 79 Joel Rosenblatt and Robert Burnson, Facebook Wins Dismissal of $15 Bil-
lion Users’ Privacy Suit, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 24, 2015, 2:35 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-24/facebook-wins-dismissal-
of-15-billion-users-privacy-suit; but see, In re Linked In User Privacy Litig., 932 
F. Supp. 2d 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (explaining that the plaintiffs survived Linked 
In’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing after the plaintiffs argued that they 
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amount of individuals’ personal or sensitive data because the state’s 
sectoral approach is too limited in scope to provide victims a cause 
of action and the U.S. Constitution lacks a provision that grants an 
explicit right to privacy generally.80 
The U.S. data protection structure is becoming an obstacle for 
U.S. corporations conducting business with countries whose data 
protection laws regulate the transborder processing of data. In 2000, 
the EU approved the “safe harbor” framework, which allowed “cer-
tified multinationals to pass data between the EU and the United 
States without interruption or the risk of prosecution under Euro-
pean data protection laws.”81 However, the European Court of Jus-
tice’s ruling in Schrems v. Data Protection Authority invalidated the 
US-EU Safe Harbor agreement.82 The ruling nullified the safe har-
bor agreement, which more than 5,000 U.S. companies rely on to 
handle European customers’ personal data.83 EU privacy regulators 
have set a grace period through January 2016, at which time the EU 
and US authorities will try to negotiate a more protective agree-
ment.84 
D. Latin America 
With the exception of the limited habeas data provisions, Latin 
America States had not adopted any data protection regulations until 
1999.85 The American Convention was adopted in 1969 at the Inter-
American Specialized Conference on Human Rights in San José, 
                                                                                                             
relied on company’s promise of surety when they paid for premium member-
ships). 
 80 Jonathan P. Cody, Protecting Privacy Over the Internet: Has the Time 
Come to Abandon Self-Regulation?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (1999). 
 81 Annette M. Schüller, et al., Doing Business in the European Union: An 
Overview of Common Legal Issues, COLO. LAW REV. 9, 19 (2002); see also Amy 
P. Monahan, Deconstructing Information Walls: The Impact of the European 
Data Directive on U.S. Businesses, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 275, 288 (1998). 
 82 Kelli Clark, The EU Safe Harbor Agreement Is Dead, Here’s What To Do 
About It, FORBES BUSINESS (Oct. 27, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sit
es/riskmap/2015/10/27/the-eu-safe-harbor-agreement-is-dead-heres-what-to-do-
about-it/#62c3674d7171. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Greenleaf, supra note 56, at 9 (stating that Chile first passed a domestic 
data protection law in 1999). 
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Costa Rica.86 A decade later, the Organization of American States 
(“OAS”)87 established the IACtHR, which was created to enforce 
and interpret the American Convention.88 The Inter-American Com-
mission of Human Rights (“IACHR”), which acts as an intermedi-
ary between the alleged victims and the Member States, was 
founded the same year to supplement the IACtHR with the human 
rights protection branch of the OAS.89 
The IACtHR is structurally comparable to the ECtHR with both 
operating as the regional human right courts of their respective re-
gions. However, the two entities have played different roles in inter-
preting and enforcing their respective human right conventions.90 In 
the more than 35 years since its assembly, the IACtHR has produced 
a relatively limited and restricted jurisprudence. This is, in part, be-
cause the American Convention was adopted at a time when the re-
gion was plagued by political instability, violence, and economic 
turmoil.91 Therefore, petitioners alleging Member State violations 
of first generation human rights have filled the IACtHR’s docket. 
For example, Mexico, one of the more politically and economically 
stable countries in the region, is currently being investigated by the 
IACHR for the forced disappearance of 43 Ayotzinapa students that 
went missing last year.92 Additionally, the IACtHR has rendered 
                                                                                                             
 86 See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human 
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter Amer-
ican Convention]. 
 87 The OAS is a regional organization open to states across the Americas. The 
OAS has 35 Member States. See Charter of the Organization of American States, 
Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Protocol of Amendment to the 
Charter of the Organization of American States (“Protocol of Buenos Aires), Feb. 
27, 1967, 721 U.N.T.S. 324, as amended by Protocol of Amendment to the Char-
ter of the Organization of American States (“Protocol of Cartagena de Indias”), 
Dec. 5, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 529 (1986) [hereinafter OAS Charter]. 
 88 INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, I/A COURT HISTORY (2015), 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-us/historia-de-la-corteidh. 
 89 Charter of the Organization of American States (1948) (as amended by the 
Protocol of Buenos Aires 1967, Protocol of Cartagena de Indias 1985, Protocol of 
Washington 1992, Protocol of Managua 1993) ch. XV, art. 106. 
 90 See generally SCOTT DAVIDSON, INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
SYSTEM 259, 259 (1997). 
 91 Id. at 259. 
 92 Joshua Partlow, Mexico’s account of how 43 students disappeared is 
wrong, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/world/the_americas/mexicos-account-of-how-43-students-disappeared-is-
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less than a quarter of the judgments of its European counterpart, in 
part, because the IACtHR has the smallest budget of any interna-
tional court and has limited personnel.93 Accordingly, the IACtHR 
has produced relatively limited legal analysis regarding the Conven-
tion’s individual Articles because the Court has focused on the 
“questions of fact and proof of fact” regarding the human right vio-
lations, instead of analyzing the scope of the Convention’s standards 
and its interpretation in the face of technological developments.94 
The IACtHR has not sufficiently developed the scope of the 
American Convention to incorporate the concept of data protection. 
Article 11—right to privacy of the American Convention, mirrors 
Article 8—right to privacy of the European Convention.95 The plain 
language written in the text of Article 11 stipulates the same protec-
tions, such as the right to private life, which are listed in Article 8 of 
the European Convention. Furthermore, Article 11 extends even fur-
ther than Article 8 to include the protection against “unlawful at-
tacks on [an individual’s] honor or reputation.”96 
The IACtHR’s jurisprudence addressing Article 11 right to pri-
vacy is more developed than the majority of the Convention’s other 
human rights because of the volume of cases that the Court has heard 
on the subject.97 Even so, the Court’s past decisions on the right to 
privacy focus, like the early decision of the ECtHR, on preventing 
violations of physical intrusions of privacy.98 The IACtHR has only 
                                                                                                             
wrong-new-report-says/2015/09/06/26a4a7be-5443-11e5-b225-90edbd49f362_
story.html. 
 93 Diego García-Sayán, The Role of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in the Americas, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 103, 105 (2012). 
 94 Davidson, supra note 90, at 260. 
 95 American Convention, supra note 86, at arts. 8 & 11. 
 96 Id. at art. 11 (stating “(1) Everyone has the right to have his honor respected 
and his dignity recognized. (2) No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive 
interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or 
of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. (3) Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”). 
 97 See e.g., García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru, IA Ct. H.R. (2005); 
Gomes Lund et al. v. Brazil, IA Ct. H.R. (2010); Kimel v. Argentina, IA Ct. H.R. 
(2008); Moiwana Community v. Suriname, IA Ct. H.R. (2005). 
 98 See LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS 
RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS Ch. 7. (2002). 
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addressed informational privacy in a limited capacity, which limited 
relation to data protection.99 
Many Latin American countries have protected, in a limited ca-
pacity, personal information with the advent of the concept of ha-
beas data, which, “derives from due-process doctrine based on the 
writ of habeas corpus.”100 Specifically, habeas data translates from 
Latin to the idea “that you [the data subject] have the data,” and 
hinges on one’s right to control the information stored and revealed 
about him. 101 The right of habeas data was first established in Bra-
zil’s 1988 Constitution,102 and the right can now be found in some 
form in the majority of Latin American countries’ constitutions.103 
The inclusion of habeas data protections across the region coincided 
with the passage of new or reformed constitutions, in the 1980s and 
1990s, which was the same time when data protection was popular-
ized through Convention 108 and Directive 95/46/EC in Europe.104 
While some Latin American countries still rely solely on a ha-
beas data clause to protect personal data, other States have been 
more active in an effort to better regulate personal data. In recent 
years, some Latin American states have followed the European ap-
                                                                                                             
 99 See e.g., Escher et al. v. Brazil, IA Ct. H.R. (2009) (holding that the state 
violated Article 11 when it applied unjustified wire-tapping as well as when it 
conducted warrantless searches of a petitioner’s home). 
 100 Lee A. Bygrave, Privacy and Data Protection in an International Perspec-
tive, STOCKHOLM INSTITUTE FOR SCANDINAVIAN LAW 166, 169, (2010), http://w
ww.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/JUR5630/v11/undervisningsmateriale/Privacy
%20and%20Data%20Protection%20in%20International%20Perspective.pdf. 
 101 See Andres Guadamuz, Habeas Data: The Latin American Response to 
Data Protection, 2 THE JOURNAL OF INFORMATION, LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 
(2000), www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000_2/guadamuz. 
 102 Keith S. Rosenn, Procedural Protection of Constitutional Rights in Brazil, 
59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1009, 1021 (2011). 
 103 White & Case, From Habeas Data Action to Omnibus Data Protection: 
The Latin American Privacy Revolution, 19 no. 9 LAT. AM. L. & BUS. REP. (2011), 
http://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/habeas-data-action-omnibus-
data-protection-latin-american-privacy-revolution (listing Latin American coun-
tries with the right of habeas data as including Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican 
Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela). 
 104 See e.g., id. (listing Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela). 
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proach by passing domestic legislation that parallels the data protec-
tion principles introduced by the relevant EU directives.105 Argen-
tina and Uruguay have gone so far as to petition the EU to evaluate 
their domestic laws as a requisite element for succession to Conven-
tion 108.106 Other countries in the region, such as Mexico and Co-
lombia, have passed data protection laws that would arguably meet 
the accession standard.107 The majority of Latin America countries 
have participated in the ever-rapid global trend toward data protec-
tion regulation.108 However, less than half of the members of the 
OAS have implemented a comprehensive data protection law.109 
Specifically, many of the region’s domestic data protection laws 
only apply to the public or private sectors individually, and others 
have data protection laws, but fail to establish a Data Protection Au-
thority (“DPA”) to enforce it.110 
The IACHR’s conduct over the last fifteen years has been instru-
mental in creating an atmosphere where the states in the region have 
already been informed on issues surrounding data protection.  The 
Inter-American Commission dealt with the issue of habeas data in-
directly through its establishment of the OAS Office of the Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (“Special Rapporteur”) in 
1998.111 The Special Rapporteur operates within the juridical frame-
work of the IACHR and is tasked with increasing awareness and 
observance of the freedom of expression across the Americas.112 
The IACHR, in reference to a report published by the Special Rap-
porteur, describes a habeas data action as “the right of any individ-
ual to have access to information referring to him and to modify, 
                                                                                                             
 105 Tobón, supra note 5, at 6. 
 106 American Convention, supra note 86, at art. 23. 
 107 Tobón, supra note 5, at 6. 
 108 See generally DLA PIPER, supra note 5. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See generally Graham Greenleaf, The influence of European data privacy 
standards outside Europe: implications for globalization of Convention 108 2 
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L., 68 (2012). 
111 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expres-
sion/showarticle.asp?artID=132. 
 112 Santiago A. Canton, The Role of the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom 
of Expression in Promoting Democracy in the Americas, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
307, 309 (2002); Claudio Grossman, Freedom of Expression in the Inter-Ameri-
can System for the Protection of Human Rights, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 411, 
419 (2001). 
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remove, or correct such information, when necessary.”113 The Com-
mission continues by supporting the Special Rapporteur’s conclu-
sion that a habeas data action is based on three premises: 
1) the right of any individual to not have his privacy 
disturbed; 2) the right of any individual to access in-
formation referring to him in public or private data-
bases, and to modify, remove, or correct information 
if it is sensitive, false, biased, or discriminatory; and 
3) and the right of any individual to use the action of 
habeas data as an oversight mechanism.114 
Furthermore, the IACHR has written guidelines advising states 
across the region not to arbitrarily interfere with its citizens’ per-
sonal data and to prohibit other private actors from the same abusive 
conduct.115 In its 2013 report, the Special Rapporteur called for in-
dividual legislatures to respect international human rights obliga-
tions pursuant to the Internet and privacy.116 Although the IACtHR 
has not addressed the protection of a person’s data through its case 
law, it has permitted habeas data actions. Petitioners have brought 
“the action of habeas data remedy” to investigate past human right 
violations by past or current governments in an attempt to discover 
information, such as the final resting place of relatives that had dis-
appeared by past governmental regimes.117 
SECTION III. LATIN AMERICAN HAS A DATA PROTECTION GAP 
The IACtHR should enforce a minimum data protection stand-
ard across the region. It must take action because a number of coun-
tries in the region have failed to pass comprehensive data protection 
                                                                                                             
 113 IACHR, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS IN THE 
AMERICAS, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, ¶ 87 (2006), available at http://www.cidh.org
/countryrep/Defenders/defenderstoc.htm. 
 114 Id. at ¶ 89. 
 115 See id; see also Canton, supra note 112, at 312-13. 
 116 See Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression 477-530 (2013). 
 117 Brian Farrell, The Right to Habeas Corpus in the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 197, 199 (2010). 
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laws and some of the countries that have data protection laws fail to 
enforce them adequately. 
A. Not All Latin American States Have Adequate Data Protection 
Regulations 
While a number of Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela, have failed to pass 
comprehensive data protection laws,118 most Latin American coun-
tries afford their citizens the right of privacy in some form.119 How-
ever, this conventional standard of privacy varies greatly from state 
to state because individual governments have interpreted the mean-
ing of privacy in different historical and cultural contexts.120 The 
antiquated privacy provisions fail to consider the modern issue of 
data protection, and both habeas data provisions and sector specific 
laws are too limited in scope to adequately protect individuals’ per-
sonal data.121 
1.Habeas Data 
The majority of OAS States have a constitutional habeas data 
provision.122 However, the right of habeas data, while progressive 
in the region when first introduced, falls short of providing sufficient 
personal data protection in the face of advancing technology.123 For 
example, when a state relies solely on a habeas data construction to 
protect personal data, the system often does not (1) include a DPA; 
(2) address the topic of data transfers or sensitive data; (3) require 
database security measures; and (4) control the purpose or time per-
sonal information is stored.124 Additionally, the habeas data remedy 
only applies after the damage has been done. Therefore, a habeas 
data provision serves only as a minimal protection of individual’s 
                                                                                                             
 118 Tobón, supra note 5, at 6. 
 119 COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 6, at 7. 
 120 See id. 
 121 See id. at 8. 
 122 See id; e.g., PARAGUAY [CONSTITUTION] 1992, art. 135, an English trans-
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privacy and is immaterial in combating the violation of an individ-
ual’s privacy through an abuse of his data privacy. 
Argentina, as well as other Latin American countries, passed 
comprehensive personal data protection laws during the last two 
decades because of the limited protections habeas data provisions 
provide to their respective citizens.125 It is unclear whether the re-
cent data protection laws were passed in an effort to comply with 
the European system or if the legislative action was motivated by 
human rights. As more states adopt domestic data protection laws, 
the international community should pay particular attention to the 
states’ self-regulation enforcement mechanisms. 
2. Industry Specific Data Regulations 
There are no industry specific laws in Latin America that ade-
quately protect personal data. For example, elements of consumer 
protection laws overlap with data protection laws, but the consumer 
protection laws are too limited in scope to fulfill the data protection 
laws’ purpose.126 First, a consumer protection law, as denoted by its 
name, does not protect non-consumers. For example, it does not pro-
tect against a company’s mismanagement of employee personal in-
formation nor does it regulate mega data stored by government en-
tities. A consumer protection law may be used in a case of identity 
theft, but the consumer protection regulations do not provide a con-
sumer with a claim against a company that stores his information in 
a database that makes him more susceptible to identity theft. Any 
state that was to expand the scope of its consumer protection law 
would not resolve the current state-to-state standard that lacks har-
monization.127 
                                                                                                             
 125 See id. at 787; see generally DLA PIPER, supra note 5 (explaining the com-
prehensive data protection laws passed by Mexico, Peru and Costa Rica and other 
Latin American countries). 
 126 See Robert G. Vaughn, Consumer Protection Laws in South America, 17 
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B. Latin American States Have a Reputation of Failing to Enforce 
Domestic Data Protection Laws 
The IACtHR should establish a minimum data protection stand-
ard in order to minimize the damage a victim would face if a State 
fails to enforce a violation of its domestic data protection regula-
tions. The overlapping jurisdiction would provide victims with a 
second line of defense by an independent forum, which would allow 
victims to seek redress for violations that the State fails to enforce. 
Many countries in Latin America, whether warranted or not, 
have a poor reputation of applying domestic laws indiscriminately 
throughout society or enforcing the laws at all.128 Whether referring 
to the divide between “legal theory and judicial administration”129 
or analyzing the issue in terms of the symbolic verses operative 
value of the law,130 the rift between the laws on the books and the 
states’ enforcement of those laws has been well documented 
throughout the region’s history.131 
It is relevant to question how resilient Latin American govern-
ments will be in enforcing their newly adopted data protection laws. 
It is particularly appropriate to question a state like Chile, which 
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passed a data protection law, but has failed to establish a Data Pro-
tection Act (“DPA”) to enforce the standards set out in the law.132 
While individuals may be able to bring a domestic cause of action 
in certain instances, it serves little practical function without a DPA 
regulating the enforcement of the law. Specifically, individuals are 
often unaware when their information is being used or stored by a 
corporation, especially when the data is moving between companies 
and over domestic borders.133 Moreover, the limited burden a con-
sumer’s individual suit would cause a large corporation or govern-
ment entity is unlikely to deter the prohibited conduct and the po-
tential damages would not justify a victim’s litigation costs. 
There are two prevalent arguments that require further analysis. 
First, some argue that the notion of Latin America having an en-
forcement issue is outdated.134 This theory is based on the idea that 
Latin American countries have taken action to address the gap be-
tween state law and social practice.135 Specifically, states are said to 
have employed legal reforms, increased legal education, and im-
proved the examination of values and actors within the informal sec-
tor in order to develop strategies to increase the enforcement of all 
laws.136 While it is undisputed that a number of Latin American 
countries have improved the enforcement of their respective data 
protection laws over the last few decades, there remains a discerna-
ble enforcement gap in a number of Latin American countries.137 
Most Latin American countries have entered into an intellectual 
property treaty or a free trade agreement that include intellectual 
property protections. However, a number of those countries have not 
been diligent in enforcing those agreements because intellectual 
property is a modern right that those countries do not have a tradition 
of protecting.138  For example, Mexico has passed a number of cop-
yright laws dating back to 1997; however it continues to do a poor 
                                                                                                             
 132 Greenleaf, supra note 110, at 70. 
 133 EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, supra note 12, at 35. 
 134 Jorge L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. 
REV. 41, 53-59 (2003). 
 135 Id. at 54. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 56. 
 138 David Switzer & Danny G. Pérez y Soto, The State of Intellectual Property 
in Latin America: Legal Trends, Economic Development and Trade, B&R LATIN 
AMERICA IP 1, 14 (2012). 
2017] INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 213 
 
job of enforcing the laws.139 Although the purpose of the Mexican 
Federal Law on Copyright is to protect intellectual property in all 
forms, the state has failed to consistently enforce these provisions in 
practice.140 The Mexican markets are saturated with unlicensed 
knockoff products, and 25% of pharmaceutical products sold in 
Mexico are counterfeit.141 Even if the Mexican government intends 
to enforce these laws, issues of enforcement still arise in cases where 
the government makes a good-faith effort due to inadequate training 
and resources for the enforcement of the law and corruption in the 
administrative and judicial arenas.142 Claims that the issue of en-
forcement is no longer a peril of Latin American states legal systems 
fail to disprove the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.143 Latin 
American countries may fail to enforce the modern privacy protec-
tion laws since the laws relate to a modern right and those countries 
have a weak track record of enforcing laws relating to modern rights. 
Second, academics claim that the enforcement critique is mis-
leading because it fails to consider that “the gap between law and 
action is axiomatically ever present [and while it is true that] some 
rules [are] more closely followed than others, a full society-wide 
measure is quite impossible, and fair comparisons are elusive.”144 
This argument is not flawed, but the line of reasoning reinforces the 
argument for spreading the burden of enforcement to the IACtHR. 
The lack of a statistical analysis regarding the specific enforcement 
deficiencies based on individual states and their respective laws 
                                                                                                             
 139 See generally Mexico Federal Law on Copyright, Mar. 24, 1997, http://w
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does not disprove the enforcement gap, but merely introduces the 
need for states to pay more attention to documenting and solving 
their enforcement failings. Whether or not it is reasonable to expect 
a state to completely eradicate the enforcement gap does not change 
a state’s obligations under the American Convention. 
The progress that some Latin American states have made in the 
area of enforcing legislation is commendable, but the majority of 
countries in the region will need to do more to reverse the longstand-
ing belief that Latin America states fail to adequately enforce their 
respective laws. A victim is unlikely to bring a claim when he be-
lieves that the state will not fulfills its obligation to enforce the 
law.145 
SECTION IV: A MINIMUM DATA PROTECTION STANDARD WOULD 
BENEFIT THE ECONOMY 
A minimum data protection standard applied across Latin Amer-
ica would benefit both individual Latin American countries’ and the 
global economy. Conversely, the region’s failure to establish a har-
monized data protection standard has resulted in a decreased eco-
nomic viability as other regions continue to develop and modernize. 
A universal adoption of a minimum data protection standard 
would, pursuant to the principle of free trade and the direct boost the 
European relations would have on Latin America, create a more 
conducive environment for international companies interested in 
conducting business in Latin America. Issues surrounding data pro-
tection have become a central consideration for corporations’ com-
pliance and risk management departments.146 Some transnational 
businesses are concerned with the patchwork of data protection laws 
throughout Latin America because it causes uncertainty regarding 
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the law controlling the outsourced data.147 Furthermore, a conscien-
tious corporation may bear added legal costs aimed at avoiding state 
imposed civil and criminal penalties.148 Accordingly, the failure to 
establish a coordinated data protection legal infrastructure serves as 
an obstacle to cross-border trade and investment.149 
International organizations have illustrated the economic princi-
ples that support the adoption of widespread data protection laws. 
APEC has invested substantial time and resources in an attempt to 
create a harmonized data protection system among its Member 
States in support of its mantra of providing a “forum for facilitating 
economic growth, cooperation, trade, and investment in the Asia-
Pacific region.”150 Additionally, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) promotes the free trade among nations in an effort to foster 
increased global economic output of more efficient, economic, and 
innovative products.151 A minimum data protection standard in 
Latin American would serve to further open the Latin American 
market consistent with the economic goals of the WTO. Therefore, 
a widely accepted data protection standard in Latin America would 
help create a stable environment for economic opportunities and 
growth. 
However, corporations in states that have not passed compre-
hensive data protection laws may advocate for a free market ap-
proach instead of a government-regulated system. Specifically, 
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businesses may complain of increased costs of compliance, transac-
tion, operating, and opportunity costs of conforming to a data pro-
tection regulatory scheme. Economic principles may even indicate 
that these costs are likely to be passed along to consumers.152 
Nevertheless, the direct increase in European business invest-
ment alone would likely outweigh any negligible costs passed on to 
consumers. Experts project that more adequate data protection laws 
across Latin America may translate to more business flowing from 
Europe to those countries.153 For example, European countries keep 
their call centers and data centers within Europe due to the stringent 
cross-border regulations of personal data.154 However, the passage 
of adequate laws in another region like Latin America, with lower 
wages and operating costs, would appeal to those private and public 
entities that would see gains from outsourcing data related jobs. Co-
lombia recently passed a comprehensive data protection law repli-
cating the European adequacy requirements.155 The law was de-
signed especially to pass the adequacy standard required by Con-
vention 108 and is expected to improve the country’s economic po-
tential.156 Latin American countries would not only profit directly 
from European and other international investors, but would also 
benefit from the technological updates that would likely follow the 
adoption of data protection laws across Latin America. 
A country’s update to modern technological products produces 
improved productivity and efficiency nationally, which stimulates 
economic growth and may lead to an improved standard of living 
for the countries’ respective citizens.157 For example, products like 
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the cloud services are advertised to provide consumers with reduced 
capital costs, improved flexibility, streamline processes, and im-
proved accessibility.158 Specifically, the global market for cloud ser-
vices is projected to amass more than $241 billion by 2020.159 Inter-
net-based companies, like MercadoLibre160 and Facebook, have ex-
perienced widespread success across the region with the increased 
use of modern technology in Latin America over the last decade.161 
Two out of three Latin Americans are now online, and they represent 
potential consumers and innovators, owners, and employees of tech-
based companies. However, widespread use of modern tech prod-
ucts requires consumer confidence.162 In short, a harmonized data 
protection standard would likely increase economic growth across 
the region by increasing opportunities in the multi-billion-dollar 
tech industry and increasing consumer confidence in new techno-
logical products.163 
While the scope and length of this article discourages any further 
discussion of economics, future work may consider the choice that 
Latin American legislatures may face regarding the dilemma of 
whether to pass more strict and expansive data protection legislation 
in an attempt to entice investment from European corporations, or 
to either not pass a data protection law or to pass a narrow law to 
encourage U.S. investment.164 If the IACtHR fails to create mini-
mum data protections, the limited U.S. companies could conceiva-
bly entice Latin American countries to remove data protection laws 
or limit the scope of the laws, in essence creating a race to the least 
restrictive data protection regulations. 
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SECTION V: THERE ARE NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVES 
The use of the IACtHR is the best forum to immediately imple-
ment a minimum data protection standard across Latin America. The 
IACtHR is the only forum that enjoys contentious jurisdiction over 
the majority of Latin American states and wields substantial influ-
ence, even if only through political pressure, across the region as a 
whole.165 The influence of the IACtHR extends past the 20 States 
currently subject to the IACtHR’s jurisdiction to the other 15 OAS 
Member States.166 While some alternatives may seem viable upon 
first glance, systematic flaws surface upon further review. There are 
two alternatives that justify a brief analysis. 
First, some encourage a wait-and-see approach because the Eu-
ropean influence throughout Latin America has already proved im-
portant in motivating domestic data protection regulations and will 
likely continue.167 Furthermore, five Latin American countries—
Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, Peru and Costa Rica—have already 
passed comprehensive data protection laws modeled after the EU 
system.168 These countries account for an estimated 185 million peo-
ple, which is a third of the total population of the region.169 How-
ever, the purpose of the IACtHR is to require all states, not a mere 
majority of states, to comply with the human rights listed in the 
American Convention. 
While the European data protection system may be the gold 
standard for governments looking to pass data protection legislation, 
not all Latin American countries have shown an interest in passing 
a European-style data protection law.170 The potential gains associ-
ated with passing adequate data protection laws pursuant to the Eu-
ropean standard, such as open data channels with Europe, have not 
been enough to motivate those Latin American countries that have 
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yet to pass data protection laws.171 Under the current structure, each 
of those Latin American countries has the autonomy to choose not 
to adopt a data protection law. There is reason to believe that some 
of these countries will not voluntarily adopt a data protection stand-
ard because of the protectionist economic policies engrained in a 
region’s history.172 Extensive harmonization of the European data 
protection standard, or any external standard, is extremely unlikely 
to occur in the near future, in part, because of the cultural differences 
between regions.173 
Countries enjoy the autonomy to pass laws consistent with both 
the ideological and cultural principles that have been ingrained into 
the particular state throughout its history and are unlikely to waive 
that right without a clear motive. For example, Section II of this 
Note illustrates how the European data protection foundation arose 
subsequent to the privacy violations that occurred during World War 
II. In contrast, Latin America, with the historical prevalence of non-
democratic regimes, developed the concept of habeas data to pro-
mote free flow of communication, which is said to promote democ-
racy.174 While there are also divides between individual countries 
within the same region, it is logical, for purposes of this limited ex-
ample, to characterize the regions as distinct collective units. 
The second alternative is to pass a regional data protection con-
vention in Latin America. While this may seem like the ideal solu-
tion, the current environment in Latin America gives little reason for 
optimism regarding a regional data protection convention. A Latin 
American data protection convention would require widespread par-
ticipation by the OAS Members. While the OAS was relatively ac-
tive in entering into a number of conventions and bilateral agree-
ments in the 1970’s and 80’s, the OAS has entered into only five 
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conventions since 2002.175 However, one may look to the recent 
signing of the Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older 
Persons in an attempt to prove Latin American States’ restored will-
ingness for regional cooperation.176 However, it is premature, with 
only five signatories, to declare the Human Rights of Older Persons 
Convention a success.177 The natural inclination to give recent 
events more weight than the holistic view is problematic because it 
distorts the importance of the full overarching view. Therefore, time 
is the only absolute indicator of whether this Convention will see 
widespread adoption and spur further action by the Member States 
in the near future. 
A sub-regional multi-state group like the Mercosur178 would 
have a greater probability of successfully passing a data protection 
convention. The Mercosur States share geographical borders, close 
cultural similarities, and have historically agreed to conduct that en-
hances the economic prosperity of the region through free trade.179 
Even though the bloc only includes five states, the protection of the 
more than 260 million people in those states would be an achieve-
ment in itself. Additionally, any data protection convention among 
the Mercosur states may even inspire the five Associate Member 
States to take action. 
However, current conflicts within the trade bloc may hamper 
any immediate action. Specifically, the bloc’s future viability has 
been questioned in consideration of (1) the 2012 suspension of Par-
aguay; (2) the Uruguayan-Argentinian conflict that led to Uruguay 
signing a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the 
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U.S.; (3) Venezuela calling for a transition from the bloc’s economic 
emphasis to social issues; and (4) the continued trade disputes be-
tween Argentina and Brazil.180 
The direct implications of Mercosur agreeing to a data protec-
tion standard would benefit the region, but fall short of creating a 
minimum data protection standard across the whole region. Further-
more, all Mercosur Members, with the exception of Venezuela, have 
already passed domestic data protection laws. While action by the 
Union of South American Nations (USAN) would have a more far-
reaching impact, the dilemma of widespread adoption, which the 
OAS historically struggles with, would have to be considered. A re-
gional convention may become a realistic option in the future, but it 
is unlikely to succeed at present. 
SECTION VI: JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The American Convention provides the IACtHR with tools to 
enforce a minimum data protection standard across Latin America. 
However, the IACtHR must be careful to act only within its express 
authority when interpreting and enforcing the American Conven-
tion. The IACtHR enjoys both adjudicatory and advisory jurisdic-
tion.181 
A. Adjudicatory Jurisdiction 
The IACtHR maintains contentious jurisdiction over the Mem-
ber States of the American Convention.182 Alleged victims submit 
complaints of state violations to the Commission, which may then 
work with the state to resolve the potential violation itself, reject the 
complaint, or submit the case to the IACtHR.183 The IACtHR is lim-
ited in its interpretation of the American Convention by the specific 
facts introduced in the case before it.184 The IACtHR has found that 
it is merely responsible for protecting the victims by penalizing the 
guilty state and should not look to resolve abstract questions in the 
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case.185 To that end, the IACtHR may impose monetary penalties on 
violating states or order the state to repair the victims subject to the 
particulars drawn out in the IACtHR’s decision. States must respect 
the IACtHR’s judgment and they almost always do.186 
While there are definitive limits to the IACtHR’s contentious ju-
risdiction, the IACtHR and IACHR still have practical options to 
help implement a minimum data protection standard in Latin Amer-
ica. Millions of people are online in Latin American countries that 
do not have comprehensive data protection laws. While the data is 
not public, it is reasonable to assume that at least one of the hundreds 
of claims brought before the Commission, especially in considera-
tion of the recent popularization of the topic by the Special Rappor-
teur for Freedom of Expression, will address data protection.187 It is 
of utmost importance that the Commission refers the case to the 
Court. The burden then shifts to the Court to find the violation of the 
Convention and to punish the state accordingly for either failing to 
create a data protection structure to protect its citizens or failing to 
enforce the previously enacted domestic data protection law.188 
However, the coordination between the two human rights bodies is 
challenging, even though they have a common objective, because 
they have met only eight times since the creation of the human rights 
bodies.189 
Article 1(1) of the American Convention requires the states “to 
respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to 
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all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of 
those rights and freedoms.”190 Moreover, Article 2 addresses the 
synchronization of States’ domestic laws and actions with the pro-
visions of the American Convention.191 Additionally, the IACtHR 
has interpreted Article 2 to apply an affirmative obligation that re-
quires the state actors to protect against reasonably foreseeable third 
party human rights violations.192 The IACtHR has repeatedly ad-
dressed the States’ responsibility to align their domestic law with 
the obligations set out by the American Convention.193 The Court 
has also found that a state violates a victim’s Conventional rights, 
pursuant to Articles 8 and 25, when it fails to provide effective re-
course.194 It is therefore the Inter-American Human Rights Bodies’ 
responsibility to use its resources to compel a violating state to con-
form its behavior to the American Convention in order to protect 
individual victims. 
A former president of the IACtHR claims the “international ju-
risdictional decisions should serve as interpretation guidelines for 
the domestic courts.”195 Accordingly, a number of high-level do-
mestic courts have adjudicated, and governments have legislated, in 
accordance with the IACtHR’s decisions.196 For example, the Su-
preme Court of Argentina first held that the domestic court’s inter-
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pretation of law must consider the relevant decisions by the IAC-
tHR.197 There are a number of countries that not only consider the 
IACtHR’s perspective, but also legally bind their respective states 
to the Court’s interpretation of those human rights norms.198 Some 
critics may nevertheless contest that one adjudicatory decision by 
the IACtHR against a single state is unlikely to create a minimum 
data protection standard across Latin America. However, states that 
have not legally bound themselves to follow the strict interpretations 
of the Court may pass and enforce a domestic data protection law to 
preempt any future penalties by the Court. 
B. Advisory Jurisdiction 
The Court should use its advisory authority199 to establish a min-
imum data protection standard in Latin America. The adjudicatory 
jurisdiction provides the Court with a more expansive jurisdiction 
than the Court’s advisory authority, which is subject to the unpre-
dictability of petitioner’s claims and the Commission’s subsequent 
claim bifurcation process.200 Furthermore, the Court’s advisory 
opinions are not constricted by the specific facts of a petitioner’s 
case.201 Instead, the Court may publish advisory opinions on any 
topic submitted to it by a qualified entity, such as the Commis-
sion.202 These submissions allow the IACtHR to address topics it 
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may not otherwise consider under its contentious jurisdiction.203 For 
example, at the request of the Commission, the IACtHR published 
an advisory opinion on whether Peru’s domestic death penalty con-
stitutional provision complied with the American Convention.204 
The IACtHR permitted the request for the advisory opinion based 
on the Commission’s International Responsibility for the Promulga-
tion and Enforcement of Laws.205 
The Court’s advisory opinions clarify, by way of judicial inter-
pretation, particular principles of law.206 Specifically, the advisory 
proceedings “make important contributions to the conceptual evolu-
tion of the international law of human rights.”207 Accordingly, the 
IACtHR has repeatedly used this jurisdictional measure to publish 
advisory opinions that reinforce the independent foundation of in-
ternational human rights law.208 However, the Court cannot use its 
advisory jurisdiction to require states to reform domestic laws.209 
The Court’s advisory opinions are not binding like the Court’s ad-
judicatory opinions. Yet, the advisory opinions have nevertheless 
proven influential and impacted both domestic and international 
law.210 For example, the IACtHR issued an advisory opinion that 
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determined a Guatemalan death penalty reservation was in violation 
of the American Convention.211 Guatemala was under no legal obli-
gation to stop the execution, but its Supreme Court complied with 
the advisory opinion even after it had petitioned the IACtHR to de-
cline to render the advisory opinion in the first place.212 Advisory 
opinions published by international tribunals have been interpreted 
to contribute to an international common law and have been used to 
resolve doctrinal differences.213 
The IACtHR has been willing to issue advisory opinions to “ad-
dress controversial or developing issues in international law.”214 
Furthermore, states have been increasingly willing to petition the 
IACtHR for advisory opinions on issues without clear precedence. 
For example, Mexico requested an advisory opinion on a conten-
tious matter that arose when the U.S. sentenced Mexican nationals 
to death without informing them of their rights to confer to their na-
tional consulate pursuant to the Vienna Convention.215 The IACtHR 
published an advisory opinion, where it interpreted the relevant pro-
visions of the Vienna Convention, even though there was a pending 
controversy between the U.S. and Mexico.216 
The focus of this article hinges on the need and justification for 
the IACtHR to act in order to repair the human rights gap, regarding 
the absence of data protection laws in a number of Latin American 
countries. However, the IACtHR will not pay attention to the need 
to act if there is not a practical method to accomplish the proposed 
action. The IACtHR should not hesitate to use its adjudicatory au-
thority if an applicable data protection case arrives, but the more 
practical course of action is to rely on its advisory authority to put 
the region on notice of its expansive data protection interpretation. 
It is reasonable to assume that a state or tribunal will seek an advi-
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sory opinion from the IACtHR on the issue of data protection be-
cause of the increasing prevalence of the international processing of 
information contrasted with the current patchwork and gaps of Latin 
American data protection laws will likely hit an apex of uncertainty. 
SECTION VII: THE COURT IS JUSTIFIED IN ADVANCING MINIMUM 
DATA PROTECTION STANDARD 
The Inter-American Court is justified, pursuant to the right to 
privacy enshrined in the American Convention, to require all States 
that have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction to safeguard their citi-
zens’ data in a manner supported by the general principles of statu-
tory interpretation and comparative interpretations by other interna-
tional bodies. 
A. Treaty Interpretation 
The general principles of treaty interpretation support the IAC-
tHR’s establishing a minimum data protection standard. Article 31 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that a 
treaty be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to [its] terms.”217 However, the Vienna Con-
vention’s modified textual approach of treaty interpretation is of 
minimal practical use here because human rights instruments are 
commonly drafted with considerable generality, which provides the 
interpreter with the impossible task of determining the drafter’s in-
tent.218 The IACtHR has supported the Vienna Convention’s notion 
that “the ‘ordinary meaning’ of terms [of a treaty] cannot of itself 
become the sole rule, for it must always be considered within its 
context and in particular, in the light of the object and purpose of the 
treaty.”219 Thus, judicial bodies responsible for interpreting the trea-
ties may use their “authority by weighing the conflicting interests of 
                                                                                                             
 217 Dinah Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 
13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 95, 125 (2003). 
 218 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 219 Id; American Convention, supra note 86, at art. 64; Proposed Amendments 
to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opin-
ion OC-04/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) No. 4, ¶ 23 (Jan. 19, 1984). 
228 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:3 
 
the parties in the context of contemporary regional or global con-
cerns.”220 
The American Convention was intended to protect the people in 
the region from human rights violations by public and private actors 
alike.221 It is therefore reasonable for the Court to interpret the rele-
vant Articles to protect the peoples’ human rights in the face of tech-
nological innovation. Some may contest that data protection was not 
considered by the drafters of the American Convention and thus falls 
outside the constructs of the document’s original intent. Even so, 
such an interpretation would not go against any general or specific 
purpose of the treaty. It is reasonable to interpret the purpose of Ar-
ticles 11 and 13 as being designed to protect privacy and thus data 
as an extension of the same. 
The IACtHR has strong support to decide on the issue of data 
protection based on the plain language of the American Convention. 
While any interpretation is subject to critique, the language of the 
relevant Articles, in consideration of the Court’s past interpretations, 
would make the inclusion of data protection altogether reasonable. 
Article 11 flatly prohibits “arbitrary or abusive interference with [a 
person’s] private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, 
or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.” 222  As referenced 
above, the term private life has been interpreted as broader in scope 
than mere privacy. 
B. International Bodies 
The IACtHR should enforce a minimum data protection stand-
ard because other international human rights bodies have held that 
comparable clauses establish a person’s right to data protection. 
While the IACtHR is not bound by the words of the ECtHR, any 
cross-referencing between judicial bodies not only “enhances the 
weight of the decision by invoking multiple precedents, but [also] 
helps produce greater conformity of jurisprudence among the differ-
ent human rights bodies.”223 The ECtHR describes the European 
Convention of Human Rights as a “living instrument, which must 
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be interpreted in the light of present day conditions.”224 The Euro-
pean Court argues “that state law and practice cannot remain static 
while European standards evolve towards greater human rights pro-
tection.”225 The IACtHR has historically relied heavily on interpre-
tations made by the ECtHR.226 
For example, In Amann v. Switzerland,227 the ECtHR held that 
the State violated the petitioner’s right to privacy pursuant to Article 
8 of the Convention when a government agency created and stored 
a card on the petitioner, which alleged that he had “contact with the 
Russian embassy” and conducted “business of various kinds with 
the company.”228 The Court reasoned that the storage of the card in 
the instant case was enough to find that the State interfered with the 
Petitioner’s private life in violation of Article 8.229 In making its de-
cision in this case, the ECtHR stated “that the term ‘private life’ 
must not be interpreted restrictively.”230 Similarly, the IACtHR 
should employ a wide scope approach while interpreting the Amer-
ican Convention for purposes of establishing a data protection stand-
ard in the region. 
SECTION VIII: THE IACTHR SHOULD PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE 
IN THE REGION 
The IACtHR should take a more progressive approach in its in-
terpretation of the human rights listed in the American Convention. 
The Court’s tradition of narrowly tailoring its interpretation of the 
Convention may be changing with recent Court jurisprudence ad-
dressing the application of the Convention to modern human rights 
issues.231 
                                                                                                             
 224 Id. at 126. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 101 (2008). 
 227 Amann v Switzerland, App. No. 27798/95, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 843 (2000). 
 228 Id. ¶¶ 15 & 18. 
 229 Id. ¶ 65. 
 230 Id. 
 231 See e.g., Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012) (protecting 
a lesbian couple’s right to keep their child under the American Convention’s right 
against discrimination). 
230 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:3 
 
Article 26 of the American Convention promotes economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights by requiring “[t]he State Parties undertake 
to adopt measures, both internally and through international cooper-
ation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a 
view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate 
means.”232 However, the IACtHR has been relatively unassertive in 
promoting these rights. 
Critics take issue with a more expansive interpretation of the 
American Convention.233 They point to the fact that the Convention 
was adopted in a time of turmoil when the Member States refused 
to safeguard its citizens from human rights violations. Those advo-
cating a limited application of the Convention argue that the Court 
should interpret the American Convention under the complementa-
rity doctrine, which is referenced in the Convention’s Preamble and 
Article 46.234 This position is consistent with the Court, which has 
specifically stated that the supervision of the IACtHR is complimen-
tary to the State’s domestic laws.235 In short, the function of the 
Court is to achieve regional peace and justice and not to be a regional 
legislator.236 
Member States have revoked their submission to the Court’s 
compulsive jurisdiction in the past and some States claim that an 
expansive interpretation of the Convention will increase the risk of 
additional States following suit. Nevertheless, there will always be 
a fragile balance in any multilateral treaty between maintaining 
widespread membership and conducting the duties that the treaty 
was intended to perform. To succumb to potential objecting states 
at the cost of protecting individual’s human rights across the region 
would be to stray from the purpose of the Court. 
The failure of the Court to interpret the Convention in light of 
present day conditions will result in a widening gap in human rights 
protections over time with the development of technology, which 
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harbors new ways to violate individual’s human rights. The issue of 
data protection provides the Court with an opportunity to inform and 
even warn the region that the Court will remain relevant and vigilant 
in protecting against modern human rights violations. 
The Court has shown signs that it may use a modern understand-
ing of data protection in the global human rights context. For exam-
ple, in the case of Atala v. Chile, the IACtHR held that Chile violated 
the petitioner’s right to private life under Article 11 of the Conven-
tion when it investigated the lesbian couples upon a visit to their 
home.237 The IACtHR has lagged behind the ECtHR, which first 
found that the right to privacy enshrined in the European Convention 
included the protection of homosexuals in the early 1980’s.238 How-
ever, the Atala decision may prove to become the beginning of the 
Court’s expansive interpretation of Article 11. Thereby, opening the 
door for the Court to address the fundamental right of data protec-
tion under the Convention’s right to privacy. 
SECTION IX: CONCLUSION 
With the end of World War II came the start of a conversation 
about privacy. That conversation has since developed into a discus-
sion about the state’s responsibility to protect an individual’s per-
sonal data. Many countries now interpret data protection to be a fun-
damental right. Present day European data protection laws would 
have required a data controller to gain permission from my Grandpa 
and his family before storing their personal information in a data-
base. However, a data controller would not be prohibited from stor-
ing my Grandpa’s personal information in some Latin American 
countries because those states have failed to pass or enforce com-
prehensive data protection laws. 
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The issues surrounding data protection have played a significant 
role in Latin America and the associated risks will prove ever more 
evident as countries in the region continue to develop. Latin Amer-
icans are in need of an obligatory data protection framework across 
the region. The IACtHR is the only feasible actor that has the au-
thority and respect to require action by the Latin American states. 
Finally, the IACtHR is justified in acting to set a minimum data pro-
tection standard to resolve the need. Any delay by the IACtHR to 
act will only lead to more human rights violations. 
 
